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1.0 Introduction  
The Middle East is one region of the world that refuses to go away 
from the 'Headline News' and 'Breaking News' of major world's news 
networks. For a variety of reasons, the world's political, economic and 
financial leaders and statesmen always have more than casual 
interests in what happens in the region. One of the major intractable 
political post-World War II problems that continue to task leaders of 
both small and major states is the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Since the 
Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979, the Israeli-Palestinian 
dimension of the conflict has assumed greater regional and 
international prominence. Governments have risen and fallen; 
elections have been won and lost; expansionist wars have been 
rationalised and justified; Arab masses have been mobilised for ends 
that have nothing to do with the conflict; terrorism and extreme acts of 
violence in far-flung areas of the world have been carried out in the 
name of the conflict! Even Osama bin Laden, who initially ignored the 
Palestinian issue, elevated it to the top as he rallied support for his 
cause after the horror of 9/11. And when the American troops 
surrounded Baghdad, Saddam Hussein declared “Long live Iraq, long 
live Palestine.”
For many state leaders, the conflict has become a foreign policy 
irritant that they wished they do not have to deal with. It remains the 
prism through which most Arabs see the US and her allies and 
continues to provide the distorting vision that makes it harder for 
many states, big and small, to address other issues. There is, therefore, 
an interest in any process that can lead either to the escalation or the 
resolution of the conflict. 
1
Public Lecture Series Volume 6. April, 2006
In the last five months, three unexpected developments that would 
impact on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process occurred. The 28 
March 2006 Israeli election was unimaginable a few months ago. The 
founding of a new centrist political party, Kadima, in Israel in 
November 2005 by the former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon drew mass 
defections and ended a generation of politics in Israel that pitted left-
wing Labour against right-wing Likud. The nation had not recovered 
from the blow Sharon dealt to the political system when he suffered a 
more devastating one, a stroke that has left him in a coma since 4 
January 2006. Yet a third bolt from the blues  the victory of Hamas -- 
an organisation regarded as terrorist not only by Israel but also by the 
European Union, United States and their other Western allies  in the 25 
January 2006 Palestinian elections.
This Lecture seeks to examine these developments with the aim of 
assessing their impact on the Palestinian peace process. In doing this, 
we shall first have a brief overview of the state of the peace process. 
We shall then discuss the major actors and issues in the Israeli and 
Palestinian elections. We shall thereafter analyze the results of the 
elections and examine their possible impact on the peace process.
But first, why should Nigerians bother about a far-away problem at a 
time when the country has more than a fair share of her own political, 
security and economic problems? Why not devote time and energy to 
finding solutions to these myriads of problems, some of which 
threaten the corporate existence of the county  sectarian violence, 
violence  in the Niger Delta, good governance, personal security, 
corruption that seems to have become malignant, alleged 'Third Term 
Agenda', poverty etc? 
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1.1 Nigeria: Why Interest in the Middle East? 
The Middle East has always been important for political, strategic and 
cultural reasons. Technological advancements and the dictates of 
modern economy have accentuated its significance. Even with the 
increasing multiplicity of our complex political, economic and social 
problems, and in spite of the geographical distance, Nigeria has to 
monitor developments in the region with keen interests.
The region straddles three continents and is integrally connected to 
some of the world's most strategic waterways. It is washed by the 
Mediterranean Sea, Caspian and Red Seas, the Persian Gulf and the 
Indian Ocean. This has enhanced its geo-strategic uniqueness and has 
placed it in the forefront of Great Power politics.
The region is the world's largest producer of crude oil. Besides, it has 
the world's largest proven reserves of crude oil. Nigeria is a member 
of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
the oil cartel dominated by its Middle East members. Events in the 
region and in Nigeria's Niger Delta now instantly affect the world's 
crude oil markets.
It is also the cradle of three of the world's most impactful religions  
Judaism, Christianity and Islam. For millions of Nigerians, the 'Holy 
Land' is in the Middle East. Tens of thousand of Nigerians strive every 
year to undertake pilgrimage to either Saudi Arabia or Israel. This has 
impacted on the lives of Nigerians in areas other than religion. It has 
been impossible to insulate Nigeria from the politics of the region. 
Both Israel and the Arabs have worked hard to marry the politics of 
the Middle East with the religions of Nigerians. Religion has, 
therefore, created a constituency in Nigeria for the peoples and 
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countries of the region. Events in the region often create political and 
economic ripples in Nigeria. Indeed, the country has internalized the 
politics and problems of the region on a scale sometimes difficult to 
rationally explain, and oftentimes to the detriment of the people and 
of the country as a polity. Earlier this year, many Nigerians 
slaughtered their country men, women and children, wantonly 
destroyed property with relish, ostensibly because of some cartoons, 
drawn by one man in far away Denmark, which they never saw, but 
which were alleged to have run foul of the teachings of Islam.
The Middle East also affects Nigeria in another way. The 
internationalization of Middle Eastern terrorism should be a major 
concern to any Nigerian government. Many times some Western 
embassies in Nigeria have to close down because of Middle Eastern 
terrorist alert. Many Nigerians took to the streets in some parts of 
northern Nigeria rejoicing at the terrorist attacks on targets in New 
York and Washington in September 2001. The Nigerian Police Force 
was recently reported to be seeking the support of the Israeli 
government to train Nigeria in counter terrorism methods. 
Many times, both the people and governments of Nigeria had been 
prepared to sacrifice the country's interests on the alter of loyalty to a 
'greater force' in the Middle East. For almost two decades, Nigeria 
took the extreme action of severing mutually beneficial diplomatic 
ties with Israel, a country with which it had no bilateral conflict. In the 
process, we put unnecessary stains on our goals of national unity, 
political stability and economic development. We complicated our 
major foreign policy objectives of decolonization of the African 
continent and ending Apartheid in South Africa. 
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The Peace Process: A Synopsis
The Middle East peace process started by the dramatic moves of the 
late President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, notably his surprise visit to 
Jerusalem in 1977, has been a story of progress followed by setbacks, 
high hopes by letdowns, euphoria by disappointments. It has, 
however, been in a state of comatose since the failure of the Camp 
David talks in 2000. Soon after, the second intifada (or Palestinian 
uprising) began.  
The second Gulf War, the end of the Cold War and important internal 
ideological, political and cultural self assessment in Israel, 
particularly between 1977 and 1991, created opportunities for peace 
that nobody wanted to miss. Thus, the peace process formally began 
with the convening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991 
by President George H.W. Bush of the United States. Talks continued 
later in Washington. The Madrid process, in addition to bilateral 
Israeli-Palestinian track, also provided for multilateral negotiations to 
address regional wide contentious issues like water, refugees, arms 
control, economic development and the environment.
A 'second track' of series of clandestine meetings between Israeli and 
Palestinian negotiators hosted by Norway also began. These meetings 
produced the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords signed in Washington 
between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman 
Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. By 1996, the 
process had produced Israeli-Palestinian Agreement (Oslo Accords of 
1993 and 1995), a formal peace treaty between Israeli and Jordanian 
(26 October 1994).This was followed by the establishment of 
economic and consular relations with Arab States  Morocco, Tunisia, 
5
Public Lecture Series Volume 6. April, 2006
Qatar and Oman. The PLO had moved its institutions and military 
forces from outside to the inside. The process of building 
representative political institutions in both Gaza and the West Bank 
by the Palestinians with the approval of their main opponent, Israel, 
had also begun.  Israeli troops pulled back from Palestinian towns 
resulting in the establishment of Palestinian self rule in the Gaza Strip 
and in some towns in the West Bank. Yasser Arafat returned to 
Palestine and he was subsequently elected as President of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). 
This was in sharp contrast to what obtained earlier. As Ian S. Lustick 
aptly observes:
In 1972, the Israeli government declared the Gaza Strip an 
“inseparable part of the State of Israel”. Israel's “three noes” were a 
“national consensus”  no talks with the PLO, no Palestinian state, and 
no change in the status of Jerusalem. Before 1992, not only was the 
Palestinian flag illegal, no political activity of any kind by 
Palestinians in the territories was permitted.
Consequently, by late 1995, there was a sense of cautious optimism 
regarding the Oslo process by both Israel and the Palestinians. The 
euphoria and the hopes engendered by the progress made were rudely 
interrupted. The Israeli right-wing struck; Prime Minister Yitzak 
Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995 by a young Israeli right 
wing Bar Ilan University law student, Yigal Amir, who accused the 
prime minister of violating the sacredness of Eretz Yisrael through 
concessions embedded in the Oslo agreements. This set up a chain 
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reaction, including calling a snap election which the pro-peace 
coalition of the Labour alliance, headed by Rabin's successor, 
Shimon Peres, was supposed to win handsomely. But the Palestinian 
antagonists of the Oslo process unleashed a spate of terror attacks. A 
series of four suicide bombings by Hamas and Islamic Jihad in 
February and March 1996 destroyed Peres solid lead over Binyamin 
Netanyahu, his right wing Likud opponent. The bombings took the 
lives of seventy Israelis and wounded over two hundred. The 
opposition exploited the situation as buttressing their claim that 
Labour's peace policy was mistaken. And Binyamin Netanyahu won. 
There was expectedly not much progress in the peace process under 
the Likud government of Netanyahu. Although he resumed the 
suspended talks on the implementation of the Hebron agreement 
(suspended by Peres following the suicide bombings), he reversed 
'the pattern established after the 1993 DOP in which Israel 
implemented its commitments while the Palestinians delayed or 
ignored theirs'. 'Reciprocity' and 'lowered expectations' over possible 
Israeli concessions on any of the key issues of negotiations were the 
dominant hallmarks of the Netanyahu's era. There was lack of 
agreement within the government over even the limited progress in 
the process like the Wye River Memorandum that was signed in 
October 1998. Election had to be called in 1999, a year earlier than 
scheduled. For all practical purposes, it is safe to conclude that the 
peace process slowed to a grinding halt after the assassination of 
Rabin. Palestinian violence against Israel, and the expansion of 
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories continued.
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Ehud Barak of the Labour alliance won the 1999 Israeli elections on 
the platform of a peace agenda. He promised to bring Israeli troops 
out of Lebanon, make peace with Syria and resolve the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. He brought the troops home from southern 
Lebanon, not through an agreement with Lebanon but through a 
unilateral action. The talks with Syria produced no positive results 
and Israeli-Palestinian angle did not fare any better.
In July 2000, President Bill Clinton convened a peace summit 
between Barak and Arafat at Camp David in the US. Barak was 
reported to have made far-reaching concessions to Arafat but which 
he turned down. The Israeli Prime Minister reportedly offered the 
Palestinian leader about 97% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
including sovereignty over some parts of East Jerusalem.  
Arafat rejected this offer. President Clinton reportedly asked Arafat to 
make counter proposals but he offered none. By September 2000, the 
Palestinians unleashed another round of violent attacks against Israeli 
civilian populations -- the second intifada -- especially the suicide 
bombings. Under intense American pressure another summit was 
convened in Taba, Egypt in January 2001. This round of talks like the 
ones in Camp David in July 2000 ended without an agreement. 
Barak's readiness to even consider concessions on Jerusalem led to 
the collapse of parliamentary support for his government.   A month 
after Taba, Ehud Barak was swept out of office in the general elections 
by the right-wing Likud candidate, Ariel Sharon.
Sharon was more concerned with fighting terror than in any peace 
process. Indeed he came to the conclusion (and President W. bush of 
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the US agreed with him) that the Israelis had no one to negotiate with 
as they vowed not to have anything to do with the Arafat again. After 
the particularly deadly terror attack in a hotel in the coastal Israeli 
town of Netanya in late March 2002, Sharon launched a military 
operation against the Palestinians; reoccupying area of the West Bank 
Israel had vacated under the Oslo agreements. Yasser Arafat 
headquarters in Ramallah was attacked and he was confined to what 
remained of the complex until he died in November 2004.
In the mean time, Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw both 
settlers and troops from Gaza and from four West Bank settlements of 
Ganim, Kadim, Sa Nur and Homesh, and started building a 650- 
kilometre 'separation wall' to separate Israelis from the Palestinians. 
Sharon reasoned, and most Israelis agreed with him, that Gaza 
settlements were built primarily to provide security. However, 
demographic realities and the human and financial cost of Gaza's 
occupation had made Gaza a potential security liability. In a televised 
address on the eve of the unilateral 'disengagement' in August 2005, 
Sharon once more reiterated the rationale for his policy: “We cannot 
hold on to Gaza for good … More than a million Palestinian live there, 
doubling their numbers every generation.” 
The only serious attempt to revive the peace process after the 'death' 
of the Oslo process in 2000 was the outlining the principles of a road 
map for peace by the quartet of the US, Europe, Russia and the United 
Nations in July 2002. The 'Road Map' was released in April 2003 after 
the appointment of Mahmoud Abbas as the first Palestinian Prime 
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Minister. Titled 'A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent 
Two-State solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict', the Quartet 
envisaged a step-by-step process that would lead to 'a final and 
comprehensive settlement' of the conflict by 2005. However, 
implementation was contingent on the Palestinians ending all forms 
of violence and terror against Israel. 
However, the most that happened was the acceptance of the plan by 
both sides. The failure of the Palestinians to stop terror attacks meant 
that the 'road map' has not amounted much beyond another piece of 
diplomatic document.
The death of Arafat in November 2004 and the subsequent election of 
Abbas as the new Palestinian President raised some hopes of a 
possible breakthrough in the peace process. These hopes were not 
realised. Palestinian terror continued as Abbas was either not willing 
or able to rein in the militants. Sharon continued with his unilateral 
disengagement plan and effected the complete evacuation of Gaza 
and four West Bank settlements, while still professing to the Road 
Map. He said he would effect further unilateral withdrawal from the 
West Bank if the Palestinians could not meet the conditions for 
negotiations. The strains and politics of the Gaza disengagement led 
to Sharon's loss of support within his own Likud Party and the Labour 
Party's withdrawal in November 2005 from the coalition government 
that implemented the disengagement. Sharon had no real choice than 
to call an early election. In the process, he left Likud which he had 
helped to form in the 1970s to form a new party, the Kadima. Shortly 
afterwards, he suffered a debilitating stroke and relapsed into coma on 
4 January from which he has not recovered.
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1.3 The 2006 Elections: The Parties, the    
Actors, the Issues and the Politics
The Palestinians
The Palestinian Legislative Council was one of the structures 
provided for in the Oslo Accords that created the PA. the first 
Palestinian election took place in 1996. Only the main factions of the 
PLO participated. Hamas boycotted the election as well as the 
presidential election held in January 2005 to elect a successor to 
Arafat. The breakdown of the Oslo process and the violence that 
ensued led to the postponement of legislative elections until January 
2006. 
Under the Palestinian electoral system, half of the 132 seats were 
elected on the basis of the percentage each of the contesting parties 
obtained from the national vote. The other half was elected from 
constituencies. On election day, each voter cast two ballots: one, a 
national ballot in which voters selected one party from among the 
contesting parties, and a second in which voters were divided into 
sixteen multi-member districts or constituencies. Voters could select 
as many names as there were seats in their district.
The January 2006 elections were contested by the PLO factions, 
Hamas and a number of independent candidates. 
Fatah  
 Fatah was created by Yasser Arafat and his associates, including 
Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Muzen) 
under heavy secrecy while living in Kuwait in the late 1950s. In 1964, 
the Arab League brought all the Palestinian nationalist movements 
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under the umbrella of a new organisation, the PLO. In 1974, both the 
League of Arab States and the United Nations Organisation (UN) 
recognised the PLO as the only and sole legitimate representative of 
the Palestinian people.
Since its establishment, Fatah has been committed to the full 
independence and self-determination of the Palestinian people and to 
building a secular state within historical Palestine. It subsequently 
became the dominant group in the PLO and has monopolized nearly 
all aspects of factional power since 1969. 
It started armed attacks against Israel and Israeli targets in January 
1965 when it launched an armed attack into Israeli territory from 
southern Lebanon. The PLO was later to move its headquarters to 
Lebanon after it was violently expelled from Jordan in 1971. Again it 
had to relocate from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982 when Israel invaded 
Lebanon. The fighters were thereafter stayed in military camps in 
various Arab countries until the Oslo agreement in 1993.  Israel and 
the PLO formally recognised each other as part of the Oslo Accords, 
the bulk of PLO members and structures came back to the occupied 
territories accompanying Arafat who was elected President of the PA 
in 1996.
Fatah blossomed, in part due to its lack of ideology, as it claimed it 
represents all Palestinian people with all its classes and sectors. Three 
militia-type organizations have developed from Fatah: the al-Aqsa 
Martyrs Brigades; Force 17, a personal security force for PLO 
leaders; and the Tanzim (or organization) militia, which is considered 
to be an offshoot of Fatah. The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades emerged 
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during the second intifada  and grew out of Fatah's need to be seen to 
be putting up resistance to Israeli occupation. 
Internal factions and conflicts became a prominent feature of the 
organisation. The most damaging of these was the split between the 
younger generation of activists who had come to prominence during 
the first intifada of the late 1980s and the 'old guard' who had spent 
years in exile with Arafat. Arafat personal rule encouraged corruption 
and nepotism. As Rifat Odeh Kassis observes: “One could say that 
Fatah's approach encouraged people with [selfish motives] to join the 
movement because the way it ran the Authority did not convey the 
message that it was trying to run any governmental structure based on 
professionalism and dignity. … Fatah became too old and never 
managed to turn itself into a modern political party with some 
discipline.” However, the charisma and personal power of Arafat kept 
the tensions and the schisms under manageable proportions. His 
death removed the lid of discontent within Fatah. Discontent and 
indiscipline were to have disastrous electoral consequences for the 
party in the January 2006 election.   
Hamas:
 Hamas (an Arabic acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement) is the 
most influential Palestinian fundamentalist movement. It grew out of 
the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-
Banna with branches throughout the Arab world. Founded in 
December 1987 at the early stages of the first Palestinian intifada by 
Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Hamas couches the Palestinian nationalism in 
Islamic fundamentalism. Israel allegedly tacitly encouraged it in the 
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late 1980s as a counterforce to the growing authority of the secular 
and nationalist PLO. It has a political and military wing (the Izz al-
Din al-Qassam Brigade), although distinctions between the two are 
often blurred. It is committed to the destruction of Israel, the 
replacement of the PA with an Islamist state on all the lands of historic 
Palestine. It views violence against Israeli targets (including civilian) 
as legitimate resistance. Its leaders have called suicide attacks the “F-
16” of the Palestinian people and have launched more than 60 suicide 
attacks against Israel. After each bombing, Hamas gives the family of 
the suicide bomber between $3000 and $5000 and assures them that 
their son died a martyr in holy jihad. It is believed that it has killed 
more than 500 Israelis in more than 300 separate terrorist attacks 
since 1993. It asserts the rights of the 1948 Palestinian refugees to 
return to their homes in Israel and that since those rights are 
individual rights they cannot be subject to negotiation or be traded 
away. Its founder, Ahmed Yassin and his successor, Abdel Aziz 
Rantisi were killed by Israeli targeted air strikes within a month of 
each other in the spring of 2004. 
Hamas is antagonistic towards the PLO because of its secular 
character and willingness to use political means and it has refused to 
join it. It opposes the PLO's acceptance of 'a mini state' in the West 
Bank and Gaza as it believes such concession will weaken its claim to 
the whole land in the eyes of the international community and prevent 
them from taking over the whole of Palestine. It, therefore, opposed 
the Oslo peace process and all agreements entered into by the PLO.  
After the death of Arafat, Hamas appears to have adopted a two-
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pronged strategy. It continues the armed resistance. However, it 
seems it has envisaged that it might be pressured to suspend the armed 
resistance and into participating in the political process. It seems 
determined to use the political process not to advance any peace 
process but to scuttle it. Thus while refusing to participate in the 
Palestinian presidential elections in January 2005, it was actively 
involved in the municipal elections in December 2004. Its primary 
objective in participating in the 2006 parliamentary elections was to 
win sufficient number of seats in parliament to be able to block the 
peace process.
Hamas is involved in more than nationalist struggles especially in 
Gaza where it is based. Over the years, it has developed an efficient 
and extensive social service network. It funds schools, orphanages, 
mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, childcare, pensions and 
sports leagues.
It has a reputation of being disciplined. It is regarded by Israel and the 
West as a terrorist organisation. 
Israel 
Election of the 120-member Knesset, Israel's unicameral parliament, 
is done through a proportional representation system. General 
elections in Israel are closed list; that is voters vote only for party lists 
and cannot affect the order of candidates on the lists and since 1992 
Party Law, only registered parties can contest an election. There are 
no separate electoral districts. For a party to have representation in the 
Knesset, it must cross the 2% threshold of total ballot cast. 
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The electoral system makes it very difficult for a party to have a 
working majority in the Knesset. Since the establishment of the State, 
all Israeli governments have, therefore, been made up of coalitions of 
parties.The leader of the party with most elected candidates is 
selected by the President as the Prime Minister. He then has 42 days to 
form a government. The members of the cabinet must be approved 
collectively by the Knesset.
There are too many parties in Israel.
Table 1
Source: http://www.vote4israel.com/interpreting.php
28 parties contested the 2003 election and 13 won seats. 30 parties 
contested the 28 March elections, 12 won seats. They sprawled from 
the ideological left to right, through the secular to the religious, to the 
“ethnic” divide of the state -- (Shas) orthodox religious Sephardi; 
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(Yahadut ha-Torah) orthodox religious Ashkenazi; (Yisra'el Beytenu) 
right-wing mostly Russian immigrants; (Avraham Negusah's Atid 
Ekhad) Ethiopian immigrants. About two dozens of the parties have 
narrow agenda; some of them are 'one-issue' parties. These include 
Halev (Hebrew acronym for “Party for the Struggle with the Banks”; 
Green Leaf (wants legalization of marijuana); the Pensioners' Party, 
that focuses on pensioners' rights; Tsedeq l-Kol, translated 'Justice for 
All Men's Rights in the Family' (advocates men's rights);  and Tafnit 
(anti-corruption). The major parties include the following:
Kadima (Forward)
The party was formed by the former Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, in 
November 2005 when he left the ruling Likud Party which he had 
helped to form in 1973. He had been forced into coalition with the 
Labour party because of lack of support for his disengagement from 
Gaza by his Likud ruling coalition. Likud was not going to have 
anything to do with further disengagement plans from the West Bank 
which Sharon was determined to pursue. The Kadima idea was 
basically a belief that models on the right and left have both failed. 
The model on the left promised there could be a negotiated peace 
settlement with the Palestinians. The one on the right believed that the 
status quo could be maintained indefinitely. Kadima's platform is that 
even if there are no Palestinian partners to negotiate with, Israel does 
not want to continue occupying Palestinians. It was, therefore, 
formed as a centrist party with a programme of pragmatic 
disengagement from West Bank, free-market economic policy with 
adequate welfare support, reform of party-based parliamentary 
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system and reducing the influence of Jewish Orthodox religious 
interest groups. 
Ehud Olmert took over the leadership of the party after Sharon 
became comatose on 4 January 2006. During the election campaign, 
Olmert did the unthinkable in Israeli politics. Politicians had hitherto 
been vague on policies during campaigns. But Olmert took the risk of 
putting forward a controversial policy initiative of unilateral West 
Bank withdrawal and made it clear that he would not enter into a 
coalition with any party that did not agree with details of his plan. He 
promised to set Israel's final borders by 2010 either through 
negotiations or unilaterally. This he promised to effect by evacuating 
most Jewish settlements on the West Bank but incorporating into 
Israel the two major settlement blocs around Jerusalem-- Ma'ale 
Adumim and Gush Etzion; and Ariel deep inside the West Bank. All 
three settlements would be on the Israeli side of the 'separation barrier' 
which he plans to complete. This is not an entirely new proposal, 
although it was the first time that it will be put forward as a major 
election platform. In March 2002, Labour's Efraim Sneh, a former 
Deputy Defence Minister but then the Minister of Transportation, 
proposed that future Palestinian state annex Arab localities close to 
the Green Line (1967 borders), in return for the annexation of West 
Bank settlement blocs by Israel.
The over 90000 settlers in areas to be evacuated, by force if necessary, 
would be relocated to, or “converge”, within the new borders of the 
state. Jerusalem and its environ would also fall within the permanent 
borders as would West Bank's Jordan Valley on the frontier with 
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Jordan for security and strategic considerations. But because of the 
divisions generated in the country by Sharon's 'disengagement' from 
Gaza and to bridge such divisions, Olmert coined a softer term 
'hitkansut' that translates as “ingathering” or “consolidation” or 
“convergence”. And unlike Gaza's “disengagement”, West Bank 
evacuation will only affect settlers and not soldiers. 
Labour
The centre-left Labour Party has been one of Israel's two dominant 
parties since the founding of the state in 1948. Frustration on the left 
of the party with the leadership of Shimon Peres, who largely backed 
Sharon's economic austerity programme and unilateral approach to 
security issues, led to the election of the left-wing trade unionist Amir 
Peretz to the party leadership in November 2005 becoming the first 
Mizrachi Jew to lead a major party. 
The party supports disengagement from the West Bank, but only 
through negotiations. It is opposed to the unilateralism of Kadima. 
Social and economic issues, however, were at the head of Peretz's 
agenda who advocates social democratic policy of increases in the 
minimum wage and welfare payments.
Likud (Consolidation)
Founded in 1973, the Likud Party is a conservative Zionist that drew 
its political power from an ideology that saw Israel holding on to the 
territories she captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. For the next 
three decades the Party set the tone for an Israeli unwilling to discuss 
ceding an inch of land. The increasing human and economic tolls of 
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occupation and the fear of Jews becoming a minority in Israel that 
incorporates all Palestinian lands forced a change of policy. 
Nonetheless, the core of Likud saw Sharon's disengagement from 
Gaza as a betrayal of God's covenant with the Jews. The internal 
disagreements over Sharon's policy led to the defection of the 
pragmatic elements within the Party to Kadima. Netanyahu took over 
the leadership after Sharon's defection. And during the election 
campaign, he moved the party back to its roots in pushing hard line on 
security and a free-market economy. He focused on the rise of Hamas 
in the January Palestinian election. It is nonetheless, significant that 
the Party no longer opposes territorial withdrawal in principle  only 
unilateral withdrawal.
1.4 The Elections and the Consequences for   
the Peace Process
The outcome of the Palestinian election that took place on 24 January 
2006 was a shock for all those who were hoping to see some progress 
in the peace process. Contrary to predictions of opinion polls and 
surveys, even on the eve of the election, Hamas won an overwhelming 
victory, taking 74 of the 132 seats contested for, deposing the ruling 
Fatah party, which won only 45. The remaining 13 seats were taken up 
by representatives of small parties and independent candidates.
Table 2
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14 of the new legislators were elected from inside Israeli jails and 
were not allowed to attend the subsequent swearing-in ceremony. 
Fatah's, rout by Hamas has been likened to an earthquake or a 
tsunami.  
The party, in spite of its overwhelming majority in Parliament, tried to 
form a government with Fatah and other factions, but they all 
rebuffed it. It had hoped that such a government would reduce the 
negative image of the party in the eyes of the international 
community. Consequently, it ended up forming a 24-member cabinet 
of 19 Hamas activists and 5 technocrats and independents. Ismail 
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Haniyeh, who was expelled from the territories in 1992 and who had 
survived at least one Israeli assassination attempt, became the Prime 
Minister, with Nasser al-Sha'er, an unelected hardliner, as his deputy. 
Another hardliner, Mahmoud al-Zahar, a short-tempered surgeon, 
who lost a son in a 2003 Israeli air strike which also broke his back and 
badly injured his wife, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Said 
Siam, another hardliner, became the Minister of Interior and Civil 
Affairs with authority over the security forces. 
 The Israeli election equally produced surprises. First, the turn out was 
the worst since the creation of the state; only 63.2% turned out to vote. 
This helped the small parties and hurt the big ones as it reduces the 
number of votes, which the small parties needed to cross the 2% 
threshold required to get seats. Second, although polls had predicted a 
win for Kadima, the size of its victory was less than predicted. It won 
29 of the 120 seats at stake. Third, it was a repudiation of Likud, which 
won 38 seats in 2003. The party won only 12 seats just like the 
religious Shas Party. Labour won 19 seats, thus becoming the second 
largest party in the Knesset. There were other surprises: the 
Pensioners Party, which had not been represented in the Knesset 
before, won 7 seats. On the whole, it was a victory for the Centrist and 
Leftist parties. They won 70 as against 50 by the parties on the Right. 
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Source: “ELECTIONS 2006 ISRAEL DECIDES”,   
Jerusalem Post Online Edition, http://www.JPost.com  
 
What do these portend for the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations 
and for the region in general? The outlook for peace in the short run 
appears bleak. Hamas victory would no doubt increase political 
instability and possible economic collapse of the Palestinian area. 
Any of these outcomes would make peace very unlikely. Under the 
Palestinian system, the President controls foreign affairs and 
negotiations with Israel under the auspices of the PLO which Abbas 
heads. Already, Mahmoud Abbas, has rejected the new Hamas 
government platform. His official position is not affected by the 
outcome of the January election as he was elected in 2005 for a five-
year term. He insisted that that he remained committed to negotiations 
with Israel, and he made it clear that future negotiations would be 
conducted through the PLO. As mentioned earlier, Hamas is not a 
member of the PLO and it is opposed to the Organisation's 
methodology of achieving Palestinian nationhood. 
Although the President may have constitutional rights to conduct 
negotiations with Israel as the Chairman of the PLO, the prospects of 
that happening, without the support or tacit approval of the 
government, does not appear bright. What will be the status of 
agreements reached through such negotiations? Such a situation will 
amount to a form of anarchy which neither of the parties would 
cherish. It could lead to a civil war which neither of the parties nor 
other regional powers would welcome. It is true Abbas has the 
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authority to negotiate but he has no power to deliver. This has been the 
bane of the PA since Abbas succeeded Arafat. In any case such a 
scenario assumes that the Israelis would be a willing partner for such 
negotiations  an assumption that runs counter to every observable 
pointer on the Israeli political scene.  
Furthermore, there is already a power tussle over the control of the 
security forces. These forces consisted of twelve divisions of some 
58000 people, which Abbas had lately reorganised into three broad 
branches  National Security; Interior; and Intelligence. They were all 
headed by Fatah's loyalists. In the period between the election 
campaign in January 2006 and the swearing in of the new Hamas 
government in March, Abbas' PA took certain measures that would 
strengthen the Presidency at the expense of the Prime Minister. The 
Palestinian Basic Law makes the President the commander-in chief of 
the security forces, while the Prime Minister is responsible for 
national security and appoints the Interior Minister. Abbas appointed 
his loyalists to a special court set up by the departing parliament to 
resolve disputes between the prime minister and the president. Abbas 
took over the control of Palestinian media by decree after the election, 
closed down “al-Aqsa”, the Hamas television station in Gaza. He also 
appointed his allies to key government posts, including the head of the 
three branches of the security branches, and recruited 18000 
additional security service personnel. Generally, he increased the 
number of government employees from 136000 allowed by the 
budget in 2005 to 164700 at the end of March 2006 by employing 
Fatah's jobless loyalists. And on 5 April, he also issued a presidential 
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decree taking over security control over the Gaza Strips border 
crossings.
Hamas condemned all these measures and vowed to nullify all them. 
Ismail Haniyeh, the new Prime Minister said his government would 
assume control of the Palestinian security forces despite Abbas 
appointment of his ally to head the three security branches.Already, 
there are violent clashes between Hamas militia groups and 
Palestinian forces and among the various militia groups.The new 
Interior Minister Saeed Seyam, said he would coordinate militants' 
operations against Israel and would not order the arrest of militants 
carrying out attacks against her. It would, therefore, be interesting to 
see whose orders the security forces would obey.
Another thorny issue is: What happens to Hamas militia now that it is 
in control of government? The Hamas government attempted to 
formally convert them into a parallel security force, but this was 
blocked by the president.Will the militia forces eventually be 
integrated into the PA security forces loyal to the President? Will they 
exist as a de facto parallel army funded by the Authority? In the 
circumstance, given the asymmetry between Abbas and Hamas 
platforms, the peace process may not be high on the agenda of the new 
government in the short run. Attention would have to concentrate on 
resolving the internal political contradictions brought about by the 
election. 
If the situation deteriorates, Abbas could, under the Palestinian 
constitution, sack the Hamas government and call for a new election. 
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If that happens and given the possible deterioration in the living 
conditions of ordinary Palestinians as a result of international 
sanctions on Hamas on account of the latter's policy towards Israel, 
Fatah may regain power. After all, the vast majority of Palestinians 
supported a two-state solution to the crisis. Although Fatah won only 
45 of the 132 seats in the election, it captured 42% of the popular vote. 
Hamas landslide victory was made possible not by a corresponding 
overwhelming Palestinian support at the polls but by the electoral 
system. Hamas won less than 44% of the national vote with 29 of 66 
seats; 36.5% of the district votes, winning 45 out of 66 district seats. 
For example, in the Gaza district of Khan Yunis, voters were asked to 
select up to 5 names out of 43 on the ballot; the top five candidates 
receiving the most votes in the district were selected. While the 
movement's supporters voted largely for Hamas candidates, 
supporters of Fatah and other parties scattered their votes among a 
large number of candidates. 
It would, therefore, appear that they have elected Hamas on account 
of its past philanthropic record, its community service, its 
organisational efficiency and the honesty, and transparency of its 
leaders vis-à-vis the inefficiency, indiscipline and corruption of 
Fatah. In any case, Hamas played down on its views on Israel and 
concentrated on social and economic issues during the election 
campaign. Unlike Kadima in Israel that made his “convergence” 
policy and unilateralism election issues, Hamas made “no reference 
to the liberation of all of Palestine in its election manifesto.”Al-
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Jazeera website conducted an on-line poll in March 2006 asking: 
“Should the issue of recognising Israel be put to Palestinians in 
referendum?” 78% of the 16,926 respondents said yes. Another poll 
had earlier shown that 66.3% of Palestinians approved of negotiations 
with Israel with only 29.6% opposing it.  
Even if a constitutional crisis or the need to avert economic collapse 
leads to Abbas sacking Haniyeh, will this positively advance the 
cause of Israeli-Palestinian peace? In the short run, the answer is 
negative. Hamas would certainly feel embittered and could step up 
attack on both Israel and Fatah. It is pertinent to recall that it was the 
inability of Abbas' PA to rein in on militants and stop violence against 
Israel that largely account for stalling the peace process, especially 
the implementation of the quartet's Road Map to Peace.   
The Un Security Council and the quartet of Middle East mediators -- 
US, EU, Russia and the UN  have warned Hamas to change its policy 
or risk losing international aid for its people. Because the US, Canada, 
Japan and the European Union regard Hamas as a terrorist 
organisation, they have cut off financial assistance to the Hamas-
controlled government, except for humanitarian needs. In addition, 
the US government has barred Americans from most business 
dealings with the Palestinian government.They insist that Hamas 
must disavow terrorism, recognise Israel and accept the two-state 
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem. The European Union that 
sends about 500 million euros ($600 million) said that European 
taxpayers need to know that their money is not going to terrorists.
Israel responded to Hamas victory by taking a series of punitive 
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measures against the PA. She stopped the transfer of a $50 million 
monthly payment of custom duties and taxes that she collects for the 
PA. The government also cancelled V.I.P. permits for Palestinian 
legislators, who have been able to use them to move easily from the 
Gaza Strip to the West Bank. The swearing in by Abbas in Ramallah 
of the new Legislature had to be conducted by videoconference link 
in Gaza. She also hinted at other measures including:
 Separation of the West Bank from the Gaza Strip, with the  
banning of workers from Gaza entering Israel and movement  
of  Palestinians between the West Bank and Gaza except in  
emergencies;
 Restriction of the Karni crossing between Gaza and Israel to 
basic goods, fuel, water and relief aid; and
 Cancellation to build a Gaza seaport.
These measures could have two possible consequences. If it is 
sustained, it could lead to the collapse of the Palestinian economy and 
the disintegration of the society in general with concomitant tensions 
and violence. Already the government is having problems paying the 
salaries of about 164700 workers, including the security forces and 
the armed militias. The Palestinian Minister of Finance Omar 
Abdelrazeq told parliament on 18 April 2006 that the PA had 
outstanding debts of $1.3 billion and could not pay salaries. Armed 
police men have consequently become restive.   
Any attack against Israel will, expectedly, be met with reprisals. She 
has threatened that any member of the Hamas-led government 
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becomes a candidate for 'target killing' in the event of any terrorist 
attack against Israel. The resumption of Israeli pounding of 
Palestinian militants in Gaza since the Palestinian election in 
response to attacks on Israeli targets, and the daring raid on the 
Jericho prison in March to remove prisoners convicted of killing the 
Israeli Tourism Minister in 2002, including a newly elected 
parliamentarian, are clear indications of Israel' resolve to pursue a 
hard line against the Hamas-led government. Attacks and counter 
attacks would only dim the prospects of peace.  
Hamas has rebuffed the actions of the US and the EU as 'blackmail' 
and vowed to make for any shortfall arising from such sanctions with 
financial assistance from Arab and other Muslim states. Ali Larijani, 
secretary of Iran's Supreme National Council, pledged during a 
meeting with the exiled Hamas leader, Khaled Mashaal in Tehran in 
February 2006 said that Iran would fund a Hamas-led government if 
the West cuts off aid. The Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 
has also said Hamas should not fear the West's threat to cut off funds: 
“Since divine treasures are infinite, you should not be concerned 
about economic issues.” At the end of a three-day international 
conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which he convened in 
Tehran on 16 April 2006, the Iranian President promised a $50 million 
gift to Hamas to make up for the loss of revenue arising from the US 
and EU sanctions.  
The entry of Iran into the Israeli-Palestinian fray will not bode well 
for the peace process. Indeed, it portends a more grave danger to the 
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unsettled politics of the Middle East. Iran, as part of its dispute with 
the USA, has in recent times stepped up its verbal attack on Israel. The 
Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad denied the World War II 
Holocaust against the Jews and threatened to “wipe Israel off the 
map”Iran has also opened its first official liaison in the PA since the 
Hamas victory. Although there are virtually no Shi'ite residents in the 
PA, and although the PA contains a huge Sunni minority that has 
hitherto rejected Shi'ite teachings as heretical, political expediency 
seems to have brought Hamas and Iran closer together. Given the 
current heightened political crisis over Iranian nuclear ambitions, 
crossing the rhetorical line to active involvement with Hamas could 
precipitate an Israeli attack against Iranian facilities before Iran is 
able to develop nuclear weapons. Israel has threatened to use military 
action against Iran if the UN Security Council proved incapable of 
stopping her from acquiring nuclear weapons. Iran is known to have 
developed long range missiles that can be fitted with nuclear weapons 
to hit Israeli targets. Given the almost anarchical situation in Iraq and 
the unsettled situation in Syria and Lebanon, a war between Israel and 
Iran would have dire consequences not only for the region but also for 
global peace and security.
Abbas, Israel, Egypt and Jordan have all raised alarm over the 
presence of al-Qaida, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, in the 
West Bank, Gaza and Lebanon. The anti-Syrian regime in Lebanon, 
Egypt and Jordan are not comfortable with the rise of Hamas on 
account of their own internal and security considerations. Although 
Hamas is not likely to embrace al-Qaida as this would further 
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complicate its international relations, expediency, a situation of total 
chaos in the PA, could bring the two organisations into a working 
relationship with dire regional consequences.
It is, however, possible that Israeli and international pressures, 
participation in government and the responsibility that accompanies 
elected office may force Hamas to moderate its militancy. Without the 
uninterrupted flow of financial assistance and investment, Hamas 
electoral promises of education, social and health facilities, 
employment and housing for the people would become empty. A UN 
report predicts unemployment rate would rise steeply, and getting to 
as high as 60% from the current 35% and the GDP for 2006 could fall 
to negative 25% from plus 5% in 2005. To consolidate its hold on the 
Gaza and the West Bank, therefore, it may find a diplomatic way to 
recognise Israel, freeze attacks against her and allow Abbas to take 
charge of negotiations with Israel. This is plausible if Hamas 
anticipated receipt of funds from Arab and Muslim states do not 
materialise. No Arab regime has any interests in consolidating Hamas 
in its current form. 
Theoretically, such a transformation is not inherently impossible. 
After all, the PLO itself experienced such a fundamental change. It 
moved from a policy of total annihilation of Israel in the 1960s, 1970s 
and 1980s to accommodation with and recognition of the state in the 
1990s. Some “terrorist” organisations in other lands have in recent 
times also experienced such transformation. The IRA in Northern 
Ireland and ETA in Spain are such examples. The recent confusing 
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signals and statements by leading Hamas figures are suggestive of 
some debate along that line within Hamas. It is also instructive to 
recall that two of Israel's most distinguished prime ministers, 
Menachem Begin and Yitzak Shamir were once labelled terrorists by 
their opponents. Begin was a leader of Irgun, and Shamir of the Stern 
Gang, both regarded as terrorists by the British mandate powers. 
Their groups launched terrorist attacks against British and Arab 
targets. They changed and later became statesmen. 
If the exigencies of governing can force a change of policy on Hamas, 
the region may have a new window of opportunity for peace. A 
changed Hamas in government, with the confidence of their people, 
given their antecedents, may be the ones who would be confident 
enough to make the painful concessions that are needed for Israeli-
Palestinian peace. It will be recalled that right-wing Menachem Begin 
was the one who negotiated the first breakthrough in Israeli-Arab 
conflict  the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of 1979.      
However, such transformation is not very likely, given the rooting of 
Hamas ideology in religion. Matthew Levitt has also observed that 
Hamas has taken concrete steps to follow the model of the Iranian 
backed Hezbollah in Lebanon and has suggested that this would make 
a possible transformation impossible. Hezbollah has been part of the 
government in Lebanon for many years and it has a cabinet minister. 
But it simultaneously participates in government and politics and 
social welfare while still continuing with militancy, whether in 
guerrilla attacks or terrorist attacks. Hamas, months before the 
election announced it was setting up a standing militia, the Qassam 
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Brigade. This would not take the place of, but would sit parallel to, 
existing terrorist wings just like the Hezbollah's standing militia in 
southern Lebanon. And just like Hezbollah, which set up an 
international satellite television station, al-Manar, Hamas said its 
efforts to set up a Hamas television station in Gaza, al-Aqsa, were 
based on lessons it learned from Hezbollah.   
Nonetheless, if Hamas moderates its views and tactics, the most that 
could happen in the short run, is to brighten the prospects of 
negotiations with Israel and not that of a peace deal. It is instructive to 
note that negotiations collapsed in 2000 and 2001 on account of the 
incompatibilities of the two sides' objectives and goals. In addition to 
the challenges at the psychological level, there are key issues that 
have continued to obstruct attempts at finding solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. These issues have been the heart of the conflict. 
The recognition of the seemingly intractable nature of these issues 
had made all the parties involved in previous Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process to defer discussions of these issues to the last stage of the 
process  the 'final status negotiations'. It was on these issues that the 
Camp David talks of 2000 collapsed. The issues are: 
 the settlement policies of Israel, and the ultimate fate of these 
settlements;
 the fate of Palestinian refugees;
 the nature of a future Palestinian state;
 Defensive borders; and
 Jerusalem.
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With Hamas takeover, Israel says the PA is now a terrorist body and 
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said Israel will not negotiate if even part 
of the PA is an armed terrorist organisation. On these, there is also 
unanimity across the various shades of Israeli political opinion. The 
deadly suicide attack on a Tel Aviv café which killed 10 and left 
dozens of others injured on the very day the new Israeli Knesset was 
being inaugurated, could only reinforce Israel's 'no talk with Hamas' 
posture. The attack whose responsibility was claimed by both Islamic 
Jihad and the al-Aqsa Brigades was welcome by Hamas whose 
spokesman described it as an 'act of self defence'.
It is expected that Olmert will form a coalition that will include the 
Centrist and Left parties. It is also possible that Shas could be brought 
on board. This would see Olmert's West Bank policies through in the 
Knesset. However, given his winning less than the expected number 
of seats, the dictates of coalition politics may force a moderation of 
some pre-election promises. The impact of this on Israeli-Palestinian 
relations is not likely to be significant. Most Israelis are agreed on 
ending the occupation. Olmert had turned the election into a 
referendum on a final separation from the Palestinians. And in his 
victory speech after the election, Olmert said he was ready to 
negotiate this: “In the coming period we will move to set the final 
borders of the state of Israel, a Jewish state with a Jewish majority. We 
will try to achieve this in agreement with the Palestinians.” He warned 
that Israel would not wait for ever.He vowed to implement his plan: “I 
want to make this clear, so that no one is in any doubt: I intend to 
implement this plan. Anyone who does not wish this plan to be 
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implemented will not be in coalition. I do not intend to compromise 
on the details of the plan. This is the plan, and there is no other.”
Israelis seem resigned to unilateralism. The general consensus among 
them is that while unilateralism is risky, it was the only option 
currently available for the country. According to Dennis Ross: The 
consensus is based on a premise that there isn't a partner, but we 
Israelis want to shape our own future and not have it held hostage to 
either Palestinian dysfunction or outright opposition.So the impulse 
towards separation, disengagement, is driven from within, driven by a 
demographic issue, which, by the way, would have led to the 
disengament from Gaza even without the gun, because of Israel's 
need to deal with the demographic reality and because Israelis want to 
basically shape their own future and not hold it hostage to the 
unknowns of what Palestinians will do. 
It is, however, doubtful if a unilateral fixing of borders will bring 
peace. But according to Miri Eisin, a former intelligence officer in the 
Israel Defence Forces, the mood in Israel had changed. “Israelis don't 
talk about peace. We talk about non-violence. We talk about 
separation. The last five years and half have pretty dramatically 
changed the Israeli  society 's  psyche and the poli t ical 
realpolitik.”Barrier walls, unilateral rather than negotiated 
separation, may at best, in an age of Katyusha and al-Qassam rockets 
and determined suicide bombers, reduce rather than eliminate 
violence.   
Hamas current stance and the continued violence will weaken any 
international community's pressure against unilateralism. The need 
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for the emergence of Palestinian statesmen from among the 
politicians has, therefore, never been more urgent. Statesmanship 
entails taking controversial decisions and assuming responsibility for 
such decisions. The leadership needs to level up with its public as this 
is a pre-requisite for an enduring Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The region is, therefore, many steps away from stability and peace. It 
is at the moment reasonable to expect a period of intense cycle of 
violence and not an era of peace. This is ominous for international 
peace and security. Nonetheless, both the Israelis and Palestinians, 
because of geographical proximity, are inexorably locked together 
into a perpetual state of neighbourliness. Proximity, it is said, breeds 
contempt, (and some will add) and children too! The parties will be 
impelled by geographical propinquity, even in a state of low level 
warfare, to interact on a range of issues, including crossing points, 
water usage, electricity, work permits etc. This will continue unless 
and until either community is able to extinguish or supplant the other. 
Neither of these options appears feasible.
Conclusion     
Let me conclude this lecture by returning to Nigeria. What do the 
various scenarios painted above mean for Nigeria, and indeed Africa? 
The impact of an escalating conflict in the Middle East goes beyond 
the issue of annual or bi-annual pilgrimages to the Holy Lands or 
shopping sprees in Bahrain and Dubai. These, of course, would be 
adversely affected in the event the region is engulfed in a war.  
Instability in the Middle East will, however, lead to increase in oil 
prices. Nigeria may 'benefit' from such a windfall. This assumption is 
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contingent on the ability of the country to continue to exploit and 
export oil in reasonable quantities. The recent escalation of the 
protracted crisis in the Niger Delta will need to be more creatively 
addressed by the government if the country will continue to bank on 
oil exports. In any case such 'benefits' may be pyrrhic. With the 
experiences of past oil windfalls, I am not sure, given the monstrosity 
of corruption and recklessness in public life that many people will 
long for another “oil boom”. Another oil boom may aggravate the “oil 
doom”. Besides as the oil crisis of the 1973-74 shows, the economies 
of African and other Third World countries could be worse off for it. It 
would slow down economic growth, and even possibly lead to 
recession in developed industrial economies-- with all the negative 
impact on world prices, trade and investment, social and political 
conditions in developing states, including Nigeria.
Escalation of crisis in the Middle East could also bring international 
terrorism nearer to Nigerian cities and possibly facilitate home-grown 
versions. Some aggrieved youths in the Niger Delta have started to 
change religions and grow beards like Osama bin Laden and the 
Afghan Talibans. The world has indeed become a global village; the 
revolution in science and technology ensures that the images of 
terrorist attacks and the modus operandi of terrorists are brought to the 
homes of the average Nigerian middle class. The picture of the bomb 
shattered scene in Port Harcourt last week reminds one of similar ones 
in the streets of Baghdad or that of a suicide attack on a Jerusalem 
commuter bus. Given the porosity of our borders and the corruption, 
inefficiency, the ineffectiveness of our security services, including 
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Intelligence, and the general lack of patriotism and commitment to the 
country, particularly by the ruling elites, Nigeria has remained a 
potential soft target for international terrorism. This is why a number 
of foreign missions always immediately shut down their missions 
each time their own intelligence suggested a terrorist alert. We need to 
recognise that the international terrorist groups that blew up 
American embassies in Nairobi and Dares Salaam in 1998, in which 
hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians were killed and maimed, had 
their quarrels with the Americans and not the Africans.
The pervasive insecurity in Nigeria as evidenced by the notorious 
spate of high profile assassinations, armed robberies, kidnapping and 
ritual killings, religious and sectarian violence that could not be 
detected, averted, thwarted, or the perpetrators identified, 
apprehended and prosecuted, should be a serious concern. Already 
the Ijaw militants have resorted to kidnapping and hostage taking and 
using of car bombs to pursue their political goals. Apart from taking a 
cue from international terrorism, desperation may unwittingly drive 
some of these groups into the hands of Middle Eastern terrorist gangs.
The action of Nigerian politicians is equally showing an unacceptable 
level of desperation. These desperate politicians with little or no sense 
of national interest and history and who continue to show no 
demonstrable iota of patriotism and humanism in the inordinate 
pursuit of their primordial and selfish ambitions could sell their 
'birthrights' to terrorists. These politicians started with political 
thuggery; they have now graduated to political assassinations and 
bombing of political opponents.  Hamas started with throwing stones 
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during the intifada of the late 1980s. They later transformed into 
kidnappers and murderers of settlers. They have now perfected the 
use of suicide bombers and also now fire al-Qassam rockets to Israel! 
A quick crafting of the ground rules for Nigerian politics that will be 
acceptable to the various stakeholders, and with national interest as 
the primary focus, therefore, appears very urgent to avert a doomsday 
scenario. Whether the current crop of Nigerian politicians is capable 
of rising up to this challenge is anybody's guess. 
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